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INTRODUCTION 
“Left” and “Right” are among the most widely-used labels to describe govern-
ment policies, parties, ideologies and political attitudes the world over. The 
terms “Left”, “Right” “leftist” and “rightist” are frequently used in public 
discourse – in newspapers, on TV and on the Internet. In parallel, the usefulness 
of this ideological heuristic is frequently challenged in the context of new 
democracies, the large number of extreme rightist parties, the more diverse 
identities of citizens and “catch all” or populism-oriented political parties. 
Therefore, the question of the relevance and content of Left-Right Identification 
(LRI) is more acute than ever before – do the terms of “Left” and “Right” make 
sense politically or should we use new labels which are more suitable for 
reflecting the present political landscape?  
One prominent reason why scholars doubt the universal applicability and 
relevance of the terms “Left” and “Right” lies in the different regime trajec-
tories of today’s democracies. Specifically, it is hypothesized that post-com-
munist societies have profoundly different understandings of Left and Right 
compared to citizens in old democracies or in those new democracies that were 
established after the fall of right-authoritarian regimes. In the newly-demo-
cratised countries in Eastern Europe of the 90s, the content and meaning of Left 
and Right did not fit neatly into Western conceptual categories (Kitschelt 1995, 
Rockey 2009, Jost et al. 2009, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Jou 2010a). 
Unlike in Western Europe, support for innovative views and reforms (see Evans 
and Whitefield 1998, Sitter 2002, Lauristin 2007, Aspelund et al. 2013) and 
social tolerance (See Lauristin 2007, Jou 2010a) is associated in Eastern Europe 
with the Right, not with the Left. To understand how serious and permanent the 
deviations which occur in post-communist countries are and whether Left and 
Right are useful terms in general, my dissertation focuses on LRI in new demo-
cracies and tries to clarify how countries’ past political trajectories and demo-
cratic experience affect LRI.  
The aim of the dissertation is to study the relevance, content and effects of 
LRI. The content of LRI is studied in terms of as the value content of LRI – 
which values (or value conflicts) do the labels Left and Right carry. The 
relevance of the construct is assessed in several ways. First, self-positioning on 
the LR scale refers to the general recognition of LRI. Second, clear value 
content of LRI – strong association between values and LRI – suggests that the 
concept is relevant, as it shows that LRI has a clear and strong meaning. Third, 
the relevance of LRI is assessed in terms of the explanatory power of the 
concept: LRI is relevant to the extent that it constitutes a useful tool for 
explaining other political phenomena. In sum, when people identify themselves 
on the LR scale, when their LR positions are associated to their values, and 
when their LR positions are affecting their political behaviour, then we can 
regard the concept as relevant.  
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In order to evaluate whether LRI is a relevant concept and whether there is 
any universal value content of LRI, this dissertation attempts to answer the 
following questions: which values determine LRI in new and consolidated 
democracies; whether these differences in the value content of LRI are 
explained by reference to the new democracies’ authoritarian past, or some 
other country specific factors; and whether or not these differences disappear 
during a country’s democratic experience and political development. By 
answering these questions, my dissertation contributes to current research of 
political attitudes in three ways. First, it covers LRI in countries with very 
different political and cultural background, and enables thus to evaluate the 
relevance of the concept and to identify a common core in value content of LRI. 
Second, it covers new democracies from the beginning of the transition over the 
decades and therefore allows to study how the content of an abstract concept 
like LRI has developed over the years, and contributes thus to the understanding 
of more general process of political socialisation. Third, it examines the effects 
of country-level variables, especially a country’s democratic experience and 
authoritarian background, and therefore improves our empirical understanding 
of how contextual factors affect LRI. 
The purpose of the introductory chapter is to introduce the concept and 
history of LRI, to point out the most important findings and contradictions in 
the literature of the field about the content and effect of LRI, and to discuss the 
contribution of the five empirical studies constituting this dissertation to the 
research in ideological identification and political behaviour. The chapter 
consists of six sections. The first explains the history and relevance of the 
concept of LRI. The second section introduces the main individual and macro 
level determinants of LRI that are examined in the empirical articles, and the 
third outlines the main effects of LRI. Following this, the scope and purpose of 
the dissertation are explained, the data used and methods employed are briefly 
summarised and then the most relevant findings of the five empirical studies are 
discussed. The chapter ends with conclusions and looks to the future of LRI 
research.  
 
 
History and Relevance of Left-Right Identification 
The Left-Right dimension has been seen as a simplifying tool which facilitates 
political communication by enabling parties to transmit information on policy 
and issues and which decreases the costs of voting for individuals by giving 
them an orientation tool; it meanwhile also enables us to compare societies and 
parties in a meaningful way (Zechmeister 2006, Weber 2012). Thus, being 
aware of ideological labels, voters can make reasonable political decisions and 
choices much more quickly and easily (Downs 1957, Converse 1964, Laponce 
1981, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Hinich and Munger 1994, Thomassen and 
Schmitt 1997, Weber 2012). 
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Although the concept is commonly referred to in both academic research and 
in everyday political discussion and the labels are used almost everywhere in 
the world, its meaning varies (Huber and Inglehart 1995:110, but also Zech-
meister 2006, Zechmeister and Corral 2013, for instance) and its positioning as 
the most relevant dividing political line has therefore been questioned, 
especially since the 1960s (Kitschelt & Hellemans 1990, 210; see also Kriesi et 
al. 2006; Hellwig 2008). Besides, if the concept is too complex, it may lose its 
value and purpose in facilitating political communication by enabling parties to 
transmit information on policy and issues and by decreasing the costs of voting 
for individuals by giving them an orientation tool (Zechmeister 2006, Mair 
2007, White 2012). In order to understand the conceptual confusion, it is 
beneficial to give a brief overview of the history of the labels Left and Right. 
 
 
History of the concept 
The history of the Left-Right concept dates back to the French Revolution, 
where it first referred to delegates’ seating in the National Assembly – those 
who sat on the president’s right (nobility) and those who sat on his left (the 
Third estate) (Gauchet 1992: 242–5 via Rosas and Ferreira 2013). Represen-
tatives on the Right supported the monarchy and opposed change, while 
representatives on the Left stood for increased rights for the lower classes and 
favoured change (Laponce 1981). Until the early 20th century the labels were 
mainly used for describing seating in the legislature, but later on Left and Right 
started to be associated with people’s political beliefs (Gauchet 1992: 1953–9 
via Rosas and Ferreira 2013). The first value conflict associated with the LR 
distinction was political or social in nature – Right seeking to maintaining the 
status quo and Left demanding change (Bartolini 2000: 9).  
The industrial revolution and the emerging classes – capitalists and workers – 
led to the increase in state support for the poorer population. Left and Right 
started to reflect the conflict between classes and over equality – Left repre-
sented the lower classes’ desire for greater economic equality, whereas Right 
marked the higher classes’ acceptance of natural inequality (Bobbio 1996). For 
many authors (headed by Bobbio 1996, also Rosas and Ferreira 2013) the main 
criterion for distinguishing between Left and Right is equality – Left being 
always more egalitarian than Right, although the level of aspired equality can 
vary.  
With the passage to the post-industrial age in the middle of the 20th century, 
several researchers headed by Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990) have argued 
that a new cleavage has appeared in advanced democracies – a cleavage bet-
ween materialist and post-materialist values, where materialist values embody 
an emphasis on law, order, authority and material well-being, and post-
materialist values imply concern for the environment, self-expression, and equal 
rights for minorities. According to Ronald Inglehart (1990), this cleavage will 
replace the economic conflict defining the conflict between Left and Right; 
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according to others (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Potter 2001, 
Freire 2006a), this cleavage emerges beside the economic and diversifies the 
meaning of Left and Right.  
 
 
Use of the concept 
From the widespread use of the terms “Left” and “Right” and from the finding 
that most citizens are able to take a position on the LR scale, which has been 
widely confirmed in both old and new democracies (among others see Dalton 
2006, Geser 2008, Jou 2010a, Weber 2012), we can conclude that people are 
familiar with the concept1. Political actors and parties also define themselves 
predominantly in terms of Left and Right in their programs and manifestos and 
position themselves in comparison to other parties’ positions on the LR scale. 
There is no surprise that the heuristic value of LRI for parties and voters as 
being one of the best predictors of voting choice has been consistently con-
firmed (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Gunther and Montero 2001, Knutsen 1997, 
Saiegh 2015). In order to make a choice between parties, people have to know 
both their own position and that of the different parties.2  
That said, LRI is not always a good predictor of politics. For instance, it does 
not necessarily explain coalition building and program-policy linkage as well as 
it could. Imbeau et al. (2001) find that the average correlation between party 
program and policy is close to zero and Tavits and Letki (2009) report that in 
post-communist countries even the contrary relationship between program and 
policy in terms of Left and Right hold. There are, however, also scholars, such 
as Savage (2012), who claim that LRI has an effect on government formation, 
even in Eastern Europe when we take into account the distinct value content of 
LRI there. This case, where LRI does explain a political process when we 
consider its value content, is a good example of how knowing the value content 
of LRI improves our understanding.  
                                                            
1  The question of whether people are actually familiar with the LR scale has been 
addressed by several authors. For instance, Dalton (2006) and Jou (2011) have highlighted 
contradictory results, such as very high levels of self-positioning hand in hand with low 
levels of value content in East Asia. Also, many authors have included political sophisti-
cation variables like education, political interest, age or vote to test whether positioning on 
the LR scale generally, or on centrist positions in particular, reveals genuine ideological 
positions or reflects ignorance instead (Freire and Belchior 2011, Fuchs and Klingemann 
1990, Jou 2010a, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Zechmeister 2006). These issues are 
addressed at some length in the first publication of my dissertation. 
2  The heuristic value of LR has lately found systematic use in political compasses and 
voting advice applications, which allow people to measure their positions and compare the 
results to political parties, being usually reduced to the LR scale. Despite the fact that it is 
mostly young and less politically educated citizens who let the results of political compasses 
influence their voting decisions (Ladner et al 2012, Vassil 2011), political compasses defi-
nitely have considerable educational and indicative effect in shaping people’s understanding 
of Left and Right as well as of parties’ positions on this scale (Kamoen et al 2015).  
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In comparative political science, LRI performs several important functions. 
First, most formal models of voting behaviour (Downs 1957, Kedar 2005) are 
constructed by relying on the conflict between Left and Right. Reducing 
complicated political conflicts and landscape to just one dimension enables us 
to make analytical inferences that would otherwise be unthinkable. Second, this 
simplified tool gives us the opportunity to compare individuals, parties and 
countries taking into account the development of society as well as specific 
periods. Comparison without simplification would be impossible as there would 
otherwise be too many factors to consider. Third, LRI helps us to understand 
underlying conflicts and polarisations in the society should we agree with the 
position that LRI encompasses the most relevant conflicts in society (Inglehart 
1984, Knutsen 1997).  
 
 
Diversity of the concept 
There are several other distinctions and values attributed to Left and Right in 
addition to the aforementioned – economic, social and post-materialist values. 
For instance, a conflict between authoritarian and liberal values is often 
attributed to Left and Right (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Laver and Budge 
1992, Freire 2008), although Bobbio (1996) would suggest that liberal vs. 
authoritarian values are good for distinguishing between different Lefts and 
Rights, just not between Left and Right (Rosas and Ferreira 2013: 9). Laver and 
Budge (1993) have associated Left with globalism and internationalism; Geser 
(2008) confirmed the association between Left and environmental sustainability 
and gender equality; Evans and Whitefield (1998) and Jou (2010a) related the 
LR dimension with nationalism; Evans and Whitefield (1998) have also found 
attitudes towards ethnic minority rights related to LRI; and Weber and Salis 
(2015), among others, have confirmed the association between LRI and 
attitudes towards the West and immigration. 
In addition to a variety of conflicts and distinctions that have claimed to 
characterise the LR dichotomy, there are also conflicting empirical examples 
and contradictions in how values determine LRI. As the concept originates from 
France and is most frequently applied in the context of developed Western 
Europe countries, the studies about LRI in Western Europe generally arrive at 
similar results, although tendencies vary somehow even there – the importance of 
religion depends on society, for instance. However, scholars stress the circum-
stances in which understanding of LRI develops under conditions of democratic 
pluralism (Noël and Thérien 2008) and ideological polarisation (Markowski 
1997), and, therefore, in newly emerged democracies LRI may be less meaning-
ful. Moreover, as expected, the findings from new democracies in several 
regions with a different political background are clearly different from or even 
contradict those confirmed in Western Europe. Still, scholars generally agree 
that although LRI is less familiar and less anchored in values, it is applicable in 
new democracies (Dalton 2006, Jou 2010a, McAllister and White 2007). 
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The following examples provide an overview of the existing variance in 
LRI. In Asian societies the proportion of people who locate themselves on the 
LR scale is the highest, ranging between 96 and 99 percentage of the popu-
lation, but the meaning of the concept is rather ambiguous for people, as many 
conventional values, including, for instance, economic ones, are not clearly 
related to LRI (Dalton 2006). In some countries outside of the developed Western 
world, in South Africa and Algeria, for instance, equality is related to LRI, but 
contrary to the conventional understanding – people on the Right, not the Left, 
support equality (Rivero 2004). The most often emphasised contradiction is 
found in post-communist democracies, where in several societies the innovative 
and liberal values are related to the Right, not the Left (Evans and Whitefield 
1998), and the same applies to post-materialist values, in case they are related at 
all (Dalton 2006:14). 
As even conflicting meanings have so frequently been attributed to Left and 
Right, Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990) and Knutsen (1995) have differentiated 
four theories about the use of Left and Right – the transformation theory, the 
persistence theory, the pluralisation theory and the irrelevance theory. According 
to the transformation theory, the content that is first associated with Left and 
Right can be replaced by some new content, for instance, post-materialist values 
can replace the values related to economic conflict. The persistence theory con-
siders the first and main content as permanent – some new values can take their 
place on the dimension, but they are reflecting the same conflict3. This means 
that although post-materialist values can be linked to Left and Right, the main 
conflict between Left and Right is still economic by nature and post-materialist 
values are clearly associated with the economic Left.  
According to the pluralisation theory, which encompasses arguments from 
the transformation and persistence theories, the first, economic conflict still 
exists but its importance might decrease slightly as it is accompanied by new 
content (values, conflicts). According to that theory, Left and Right have more 
than one meaning and those meanings might not totally overlap. Flanagan 
(1979, 1980, 1987) differentiates the economic and cultural content (post-
materialism) of Left and Right, where economic and cultural Left do not have to 
occur only hand in hand with each other but where there is also possibility that 
cultural Left and economic Right are combined, for example. The fourth, the 
irrelevance theory, is the most extreme, challenging the relevance and usability 
of the whole concept in changed conditions – according to this approach, Left 
and Right as an intrinsically economic conflict died with the end of industrial 
age and the post-industrial era is described by different conflicts, e.g. materialist 
versus post-materialist values, etc.  
I will use these four theories as assisting tools or starting points for assessing 
the relevance and value content of LRI. The content of LRI is studied mainly 
through the values which determine LRI, and, in addition, three theories – 
                                                            
3  Kriesi et al. 2006: two (economic and cultural) dimensions are related and therefore only 
one dimension exists. 
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pluralisation, persistence and transformation – can reveal more about the nature 
of LR identification. The relevance is evaluated in several ways. First, recog-
nising that the terms “Left” and “Right” allow one to position oneself on the LR 
scale shows whether the concepts make sense in the most superficial way. 
Second, strong LR value anchoring as strong relationship between values and 
LRI is also a sign that the concept is relevant, as it shows that LRI has a clear 
and strong meaning. And third, though more directly, even studying the effect of 
LRI can show us whether the concept is useful.  
 
 
Determinants of Left-Right Identification  
In order to evaluate the relevance and content of LRI, the articles of the 
dissertation examine various factors that determine LRI. This section provides 
an overview of the most important individual and country level factors which 
have been considered as determinants of LRI and which will be addressed in the 
empirical studies constituting the dissertation4. Both the factors that influence 
individuals’ ability to position themselves ideologically and the factors that 
explain individuals’ ideological positioning on the Left-Right dimension are 
examined, although the focus is on the latter.  
LRI is usually divided into three components – social structure, values and 
partisanship (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, 
Huber 1989, Knutsen 1997, Freire 2008, Weber 2012, Medina 2015), which can 
be further divided into two components – symbolic5, which includes social 
structure and partisanship, and ideological, which includes values, attitudes and 
issues priorities (Weber 2012). I rely on those distinctions, first addressing the 
symbolic component – social structure and partisanship – and then the 
ideological component on the individual level and thereafter focusing on 
country-level influences. It is important to specify that, when studying the 
content of LRI in this dissertation, the ideological component of LRI is central; 
the symbolic component rather helps us to understand more specifically the 
ideological content of LRI. 
There are also some other factors, like basic personal values (Piurko et al 
2011, Caprara et al 2006), personality traits (Fatke 2016, Bakker 2016, Gerber 
et al 2010, 2011), genetic (Alford et al 2005, Hatemi et al 2014) and cognitive 
factors (Hibbing et al 2014, Dodd et al 2012, Oxley et al 2008), which scholars 
have related to LRI, but as I have to limit the scope of the research I only cover 
factors that fall beyond the usual scope of political science study of factors. 
 
                                                            
4  The findings from the articles that constitute this dissertation are presented in later 
sections, even if they have been published chronologically earlier compared to some of the 
findings that are presented in this section. 
5  Partisanship and social structure give symbolic meaning to LRI in referring to political 
parties or social groups but they do not constitute the idea-level content, even though they 
are more closely associated to LRI than values are. (Weber 2012: 10–11) 
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Left-Right Identification and the Symbolic Component:  
Social Structure and Partisanship 
This subsection introduces how several social demographic aspects and people’s 
social and political identification influence their LRI. People’s social position 
and their social identification is one of the most common factors taken into 
account in studying most of the phenomena in political and social sciences, and 
ideological identification is no exception. Even though studies confirm 
decreasing (Franklin et al 1992) or weak (Eijk et al 2005) structuring effect of 
social structure on LRI, especially in new democracies (Innes 2002, Sitter 
2001), there are scholars (Whitefield 2002: 191, Van der Brug 2010: 602) who 
argue that when new post-communist countries and Western democracies are 
compared, social factors have a comparatively similar strong effect. 
Religiosity is considered as an important factor in reinforcing conservative 
and traditional moral values; hence religious people should incline to the Right 
end of the ideological spectrum. The effect of religiosity on LRI is found almost 
everywhere (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, Geser 2008: 28, Weber 2012: 
114, Medina 2015: 785). It is strong in Eastern Europe (Geser 2008: 28), but 
rather weak in some other less developed societies outside of Europe, like African 
and Arab societies (Dalton 2006: 16). Moreover, when almost all people are 
religious in a society, as is the case in Latin America, the relationship between 
religiosity and LRI is weaker as there is less variance in the level of religiosity 
(Geser 2008: 28). The importance of religiosity structuring ideological identi-
fication can be seen also as a pre-modern and passing phenomenon, but present 
developments in international and also in national politics, like terrorism and 
migration, suggest that the formative influence of religiosity and beliefs on our 
judgement and worldview continues to be relevant. Inglehart (1990) has also 
mentioned the probable increasing effect of religiosity in replacing the declining 
importance of class and party identification. As religiosity may even gain more 
importance in everyday politics, the effect of religiosity in structuring LRI in a 
rightist direction is considered throughout this dissertation. 
Income and class are other factors that affect a person’s LRI and can be 
directly related through both social and economic values. More well-off people 
are interested in preserving the existing system, including the unequal distri-
bution of resources, while those who are less well-off want to change the system 
in order to equalise the allocation of resources and improve their economic 
status. The tendency that people with higher income and higher social status 
incline to the Right and less fortunate people incline to the Left is confirmed in 
most studies in Western Europe (Geser 2008, Jou 2010a).  
In the case of post-communist and other former authoritarian countries, the 
effect of status can be absent because during the authoritarian period the eco-
nomic differences between citizens were more or less eliminated and therefore 
its structuring effect may have been lost. Another explanation for weak pre-
dicting power is offered by Evans and Whitefield (1993, 1998) which suggests 
volatility of new party systems as a possible cause. However, most studies tend 
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to confirm at least some relationship between socio-economic status and LRI in 
new democracies, albeit somewhat weaker and less stable (Jou 2010a among 
many). 
Some studies (Jou 2010a: 39) have confirmed that people with a higher in-
come and a better social position are also more able to identify themselves 
ideologically, but this is partly a mediatory effect as higher income and position 
often goes hand in hand with better education, with more resources for attaining 
information and with greater political interest. There are also differences 
between elite and mass understanding (Zechmeister 2006) which can be related 
to a person’s social status but as the focus of the present study is on the macro 
level I do not address these differences here. 
An individual’s age can affect LRI in various ways – as a direct effect of 
age, or as an effect of cohort or life cycle. As a straight predictor of LRI, the 
general tendency is that older people incline to the Right, supporting the status 
quo and already existing inequalities as they have accumulated some posses-
sions during a lifetime, while younger people lean to the Left, challenging the 
existing order. The same tendency can be explained also socio-psychologically – 
although personal traits do not change greatly over time, there is evidence that 
conscientiousness, which is related to conservative views (Gerber et al 2011, 
though not everywhere according to Fatke 2016), increases over time and 
openness to experiences, which is related to liberal views (Gerber et al 2011, 
though not everywhere according to Fatke 2016), decreases over time (Sri-
vastava et al 2003). The famous quote “If you are not a liberal at 25, you have 
no heart. If you are not a conservative at 35, you have no brain”6 illustrates the 
common relationship between age and LRI in similar way. 
In case of post-communist countries older people have been found to hold, 
though not always and everywhere, rather leftist views (Jou 2010a: 72–73). 
Here are at least two possible explanations. First, older cohorts were socialised 
under communist rule and remain faithful to their leftist views (offered also by 
Jou 2010a: 73), while at the same time younger cohorts are opposed to the 
former system and therefore have rightist views. Second, as a contrast to 
Western democracies where older people have gathered more wealth and are 
economically more secure compared to younger people, in post-communist 
countries older cohorts are economically disadvantaged – small pensions and no 
property – and therefore incline more to the Left than younger cohorts. More 
precise studies in order to confirm which explanation is more likeable are still to 
be undertaken.  
The effect of age on the ability to identify ideologically has also been tested 
and as one might expect, all other aspects kept constant, usually older people 
are more aware of political terms including “Left” and “Right”. This is because 
they have had more time to become familiar with the terms during their life. 
The exception here again is regime change, after which young people may 
                                                            
6  For more about this quote see the following page:  
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/02/24/heart-head/ 
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acquire new information and adjust to the new situation more quickly (Freire, 
2006a). the findings do not clearly confirm those expectations, however – there 
is a missing or weak relationship between age and ability to identify 
ideologically, although there is some truth in the statement that in some more 
mature democracies older people are more able to locate themselves on the LR 
dimension (than younger people) and in some new democracies younger people 
(rather than older people) are more able to do likewise (Geser 2008: 33, Jou 
2010a: 39–40).  
The life cycle effects are generally found to be not worthwhile examining in 
research of LRI and their possible effect can be similar to those mentioned 
earlier – older people tend to be more conservative and rightist as they are less 
open to new things or because they have more assets to lose, or they incline to 
the Left if their socio-economic status is low, as it has been in post-communist 
countries. Despite the fact that in case of age the assumptions cannot be so 
clear, its direct effect, but not cohort or life cycle effect, on LRI is studied 
throughout the empirical articles of this dissertation.  
If we proceed with the understanding that well-off people tend to incline to 
the Right and less well-off people incline to the Left, then more educated people 
should hold rightist views as generally better education leads to a better job and 
to a higher status in society. However, contrary to that expectation, most studies 
in Western societies confirm the opposite – more educated people hold leftist 
views (Jou 2010a: 71, Geser 2008: 21). At the same time, studies on new 
democracies and Eastern Europe affirm the positive relationship between higher 
educational level and the Right (Jou 2010a: 72–73, Geser 2008: 21). One 
potential explanation is given by distinguishing between the cultural and 
economic capital of education (see Achterberg and Houtman 2006, Van de 
Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). When education is perceived as cultural capital, 
educated people as more liberal incline to the Left; when it is perceived as 
mainly economic capital and pursued for practical economic causes, educated 
people as better equipped for the future incline to the Right.  
Although the effect of education is a tricky one as it can affect LRI in both 
ways, it goes hand in hand – as do other characteristics related to political 
sophistication like political interest, political knowledge and media exposure – 
with a person’s ability to identify ideologically and with better understanding of 
the concept. The tendency that more educated and more politically-interested 
people are better able to identify themselves ideologically is repeatedly 
confirmed (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 209, Evans, Heath & Lalljee 
1996:106, Freire and Belchior 2011), although the effect of education and 
political interest is stronger in developed Western societies compared to other 
regions (Geser 2008: 22). A trend that values and issues are more anchored in 
LRI among educated and politically-interested people is also confirmed 
(Zechmeister 2010: 5–6, Freire and Belchior 2011). Similarly to ability to 
identify ideologically, the latter applies more clearly in developed democracies 
(Geser 2008: 32). As education plays an important and conflicting role in 
affecting people’s understanding of ideology, the effect of education is 
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considered in most empirical articles but is more central in those which address 
the ability to identify on the LR scale and the relevance of LRI. 
Place of residence has in the past had a stronger effect on LRI in less 
developed societies in the context of less mobility; today it is related to Left and 
Right rather indirectly through other socio-demographic factors. Rural 
populations tend to be older, less educated, less wealthy and more religious, and 
hence they usually hold rightist views compared to urban populations. The 
effect of residence is confirmed in Western developed societies (Jou 2010a: 71); 
in new democracies, however, town size does not have the same effect (Jou 
2010a: 72) and compared to other socio-demographic factors it is not found to 
be important, especially if other factors are included in an analysis (Jou 2010b: 
104–5).  
Gender differences in ideological leanings are not so evident but there is a 
weak tendency of women to hold leftist views. That can be explained as follows: 
women being economically, and frequently also politically, disadvantaged have 
more reason to challenge the existing inequalities (Jou 2010a: 71–72) and they 
rely more on state welfare, for child care and family allowance, and therefore 
prefer a generous social state. There is, however, also an alternative explanation 
for why in some cases or countries women lean to the Right – they are more 
religious and share more conservative values. In one’s ability to identify ideo-
logically, gender differences are more evident, although not universal (Jou 
2010a: 41, Geser 2008: 33). Men are more able to position themselves ideo-
logically than women and, surprisingly, differences between the genders are 
equally existent in older as well as in younger democracies. The differences can 
be explained by the circumstances in which men have been historically more 
involved in public affairs and politics, and women’s right to vote was 
established comparatively recently and is still not applied worldwide. The effect 
of place of residence and gender are controlled in most of the empirical articles 
in this thesis, but, as their part in affecting LRI is rather marginal and not 
important in context of current study, I do not delve more in depth here.  
Partisanship is the most important political identification related to LRI. The 
relationship between party identification or party choice7 and LRI is a reciprocal 
one – people may support a certain party and form their ideological position 
from their party preference or they may have certain ideological beliefs and 
choose the party who most reflects those beliefs. The changes in ideological and 
partisan identification can take place also simultaneously and the direction of 
causality is often unclear. Reciprocal causality between party identification and 
LRI is understudied, but this endogeneity problem is emphasised by Sani (1974) 
and Medina (2015) and addressed by Belanger and Aarts (2006) and Lewis-
Beck and Costa Lobo (2011), for example. In this subsection, I only address the 
effect of party identification on LRI; the reverse influence is covered hereinafter. 
                                                            
7  Party choice is considered as a proxy for a party identification when survey data on party 
identification are not available. 
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Party identification or party choice has been regarded as one of the main 
components of LRI ever since the publication of a study by Inglehart and 
Klingemann (1976). Although strength of effect of party identification varies by 
country and over time and later studies show a rather declining effect of partisan 
component (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 232), it has an important role in how 
people identify themselves ideologically (Huber 1989, Knutsen 1997, 1998, 
Freire 2006a, Medina 2015), especially among less sophisticated citizens 
(Inglehart and Klingemann 1976) and in political systems with fewer parties 
(Knutsen 1997:199–200, 210) and higher ideological polarisation (Medina 
2015: 786). Knutsen (1998) claims that the declining effect can be explained by 
people’s increasing tendency to position themselves, more and more, towards 
the centre of the ideological spectrum.  
Party identification and ability to identify ideologically are also related. 
People with strong party preferences tend to place themselves on the LR scale 
more frequently (Freire and Belchior 2011, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, 
Zechmeister 2006). Again, it is difficult to evaluate whether they are just two 
co-existing phenomena – better informed and more sophisticated people tend to 
identify themselves ideologically and on a party basis more often; either that, or 
they have a mutual effect – people with clear party preferences have a better 
understanding of the ideological concept and people who are aware of the 
ideological concept can derive their own preferences more easily. In case of the 
ability to identify ideologically we can treat party identification as one variable 
among others reflecting the person’s sophistication. In the empirical studies of 
this dissertation, party identification is mostly incorporated as a determinant in 
studying relevance (as ability to locating oneself on the LR scale), not content 
of LRI, because in large N studies coding and interpreting of all parties’ 
positions on LRI would not be cost-effective.  
 
 
Left-Right Identification and the Ideological Component: Values  
The decreasing effect of social structure factors occurs in parallel with the 
increasing effect of values on the LR dimension. Values play the central role in 
forming the ideological content of Left and Right and therefore they are at the 
focus of this dissertation as the best communicators of the content of LRI. 
Values are important in explaining ideological positioning in both new and old 
democracies (Huber 1989, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Knutsen 1997, Jou 
2010a, Weber 2012) but are more anchored to Left and Right in the latter (Jou 
2010a: 174–6). The variety of values that has been found to be associated with 
LRI is extensive; I therefore focus here on the most essential values. Many 
scholars (Benoit and Laver 2007, Kriesi et al. 2006, Jost et al. 2003, Choma et 
al. 2010) find that LRI is determined above all by two types of values – 
economic (equality and competition) and social or cultural (conservatism versus 
liberalism) – in nature and I therefore start with those.  
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Starting from the industrial revolution LRI has been most frequently 
associated with economic values – people who support equality in economic 
terms, state intervention and wealth redistribution hold leftist views, and people 
who support natural inequality, the private market and a minimal state hold 
rightist views (Lipset 1954, Downs 1957, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Evans, 
Heath and Lalljee 1996). The effect of economic values on LR ideology has 
been confirmed in developed Western countries (among others, Weber and Saris 
2014, Geser 2008, Corbetta et al 2009) as well as in newer democracies (Kitschelt 
et al 2010, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009, Geser 2008, McAllister and 
White 2007, Markowski 1997, Medina 2015, Freire 2015). Pop-Eleches and 
Tucker (2010) have even argued that economic values are more central to 
determining LRI in East and Central Europe than in Western Europe.  
In general, economic values are less anchored in LR ideology in new 
democracies compared to older democracies as the use of ideological dimension 
takes some time (Aspelund et al 2013, Thorisdottir et al 2007, Kitschelt et al 
1999), but the association is still there right after the democratic transition. 
There are only a few cases when economic values have found not to be related 
to LR ideology, for instance in East Asia (Dalton 2006: 13). In the case of Latin 
America, some authors (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009) have found that the 
dimension of deregulation and privatisation reflects the issues of economic 
policy better than the traditional “taxes versus spending” dimension and the 
weak relationship between economic values and LRI in Latin America may 
therefore be partly attributed to measurement issues. 
In a very small number of cases there is also some confusion as to which 
way economic values are related to Left and Right, for instance citizens in 
Honduras and citizens with low level of political knowledge in Mexico and 
Uruguay do support a bigger role for the state and Right ideology at the same 
time (Zechmeister and Corral 2010: 5), which is contrary to the conventional 
relationship. However, cases where economic values are associated with the 
Left and Right contrary to the ordinary manner are rather exceptional and not 
worthy of a detailed treatment here. All empirical articles study the relationship 
between economic values and LRI, in order to evaluate the relevance of LRI in 
measuring how strong the economic value content is or to explore the content in 
measuring how strongly and in which way values and LRI are related. 
Moreover, although the findings are not unidirectional, the general assumption 
is that in societies where political discourse of Left and Right is more developed, 
economic values form an important part of LRI. I also expect that those who 
support state intervention and wealth redistribution incline to the Left universally.  
The second most frequently confirmed values constituting the LR dimension 
are social values. Social values can be characterised as involving a conflict 
between authoritarian and liberal values or a conflict between religious/moral 
values and less rigid views, like tolerating abortion, homosexuality, etc. This 
means that liberal and tolerant people hold leftist views and authoritarian and 
more morally-rigid people hold rightist views (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 
Laver and Budge 1992, Norris and Inglehart 2004, Freire 2008). Social values 
23 
have been associated with LRI in older Western democracies (Lewis-Beck and 
Lobo 2011, Noelle-Neumann 1998) as well as in new democracies (Evans and 
Whitefield 1995, Mészáros et al 2007, Geser 2008, Szczerbiak 2008, Rohr-
schneider and Whitefield 2009, Freire 2015), and in some countries, like the 
Netherlands, they may become even more important than economic values over 
time (Vries et al 2013).  
In spite of the assumption that in new democracies social values might not 
have similarly strong effect on LRI compared to older democracies because 
authoritarian regimes discouraged religious practice, research assures the 
opposite. Although in the case of Eastern Europe several findings confirm that 
the association between social values and LRI is in conflict with the con-
ventional Western pattern, there is a clear effect – authoritarian values and 
intolerance go hand in hand with the Left, not with the Right there (Jou 2010a: 
87, Lauristin 2007: 53, Kitschelt 1992). Vachudova and Hooghe (2009: 206) 
have reached the same result in analysing party policy positions – economic 
Left was related to traditional cultural values and economic Right was related to 
social liberalism.8 Similarly to economic values, social values are included in 
the empirical analyses and I expect that generally liberally-minded people 
incline to the Left, but consequently from conflicting findings I also assume 
some variation between countries, which I hope to explain by involving country 
factors. 
Third, since the 1970s scholars (led by Ronald Inglehart) have argued that in 
advanced democracies a conflict between materialist and post-materialist values 
has merged (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Potter 2001). The 
studies confirm that generally post-materialist people tend to hold leftist views, 
and this tendency holds both in advanced and in new democracies, like Latin 
America, for example (Dalton 2006). In Eastern Europe and in Africa the 
relationship is frequently found to be the opposite – post-materialist people 
incline to the Right (Dalton 2006:14) and in East Asia the findings are even 
more controversial and depend on specific issues – in considering post-
materialist values generally and gender equality, the East Asian population is 
similar to the Western population, in environmental issues the reverse relation-
ship applies – more environmentally-friendly people incline to the Right (Dalton 
2006, Geser 2008). Many scholars (Jou 2010a, Geser 2008: 25–6, Jurkynas 2003: 
36–8, for instance) have also found no relationship between materialist/post-
                                                            
8  The conflict between supporting change versus maintaining the status quo can be treated 
as overlapping with social values or as a part of the conflict between liberal and conservative 
values, thus confirming the deviant nature of LRI in post-communist countries. Markowski 
(1997: 223) confirmed that in post-communist societies change could often mean moving 
away from the Left and from equality and not in the direction of it. Recent studies show that 
Eastern European countries vary widely in how support for change is related to LRI. The 
association is like that in the West – those who support change incline to the Left – as in 
Slovenia and Croatia; the opposite is true in Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, and the relationship is absent in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania, and varies in 
Poland, Romania and Ukraine (Aspelund et al 2013). 
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materialist values and LRI in new democracies, especially at the beginning of 
the democratic period and especially in Eastern Europe. This is explained by the 
tendency that post-materialist values start to spread in economically more 
advanced societies – also Jou (2010) confirmed that post-materialist values 
influence LRI more in wealthier societies. Post-materialist values are included 
in the empirical articles of this dissertation and I expect them to structure LRI 
when societies are socio-economically developed.  
In addition, conflict between materialist and post-materialist values can be 
treated as overlapping with social values as new social movements have fought 
for liberal values and social justice and their opponents defend traditional/ 
authoritarian values. Several authors (Jou 2010a: 15, Kriesi 2010: 683, Freire 
2015: 47) argue that materialist/post-materialist values overlap substantially 
with liberal/authoritarian values (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, Kitschelt 1995). 
Flanagan has criticised the Inglehart scale since 1979 (Flanagan 1979, 1980, 
1987), arguing that it measures rather the difference between authoritarians and 
libertarians and he concludes that there is a change afoot from authoritarian 
values towards libertarian ones in Western Europe (Flanagan and Lee 2003). 
Based on this overlapping nature between materialist/post-materialist and 
liberal/authoritarian and social values, I expect materialist/post-materialist values 
to have a similar effect on LRI as social values have, with the exception of 
socio-economic development, which should affect more the importance of the 
materialist/post-materialist dimension. 
The fourth type of values worth outlining is that related to support for 
democracy. Many authors led by Moreno (1999) have outlined that common 
conflicts are overshadowed or less apparent in new democracies because of the 
specific conflict between those who support the new democratic system and 
those who preferred the previous authoritarian regime. This tendency has been 
found in new democracies irrespective of their authoritarian past, in Southern 
Europe (Moreno 1999), East Asia (Lin et al 1996, Shin and Jhee 2005), Latin 
America (Dalton 2006) and in Eastern Europe (Evans and Whitefield 1998, 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield 1999, Jou 2010a, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). 
The direction in which democratic values are related to LRI varies depending on 
the former authoritarian regime – in societies coming from a right-authoritarian 
regime, those who support democracy incline to the Left (in Southern Europe 
and Latin America), and in societies coming from a left-authoritarian regime, 
those who support democracy incline to the Right (Eastern Europe). This kind 
of a relationship is interpreted as an initial reaction to the former regime as the 
previous authoritarian regime is related to the Right in former right-authori-
tarian countries and to the Left in former left-authoritarian countries (Dalton 
2006: 16). East Asia, where different studies refer to a different direction of 
relationship, is exceptional again (Shin and Jhee 2005: 390, Dalton 2006: 16). 
However, unlike other values, conflict over supporting or not supporting the 
democratic turn is considered as a passing conflict, which appears in new 
democracies but is not characteristic to consolidated democracies (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, Lin et al 1996, Jou 2010a, Shin and Jhee 2005). There are several 
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findings indicating that democratic values could lose their importance after 
some transition period in democracies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Evans 
and Whitefield 1998, Kitschelt et al 1995, Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012). The 
findings on the existence of democratic conflict are somewhat ambiguous – 
democratic conflict is still present even after a decade or more in some post-
communist countries, but rather missing from the beginning of democracy in 
other countries (more details in Jou 2010b, Jou 2010c, Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield 2009). The overall trend is that with passage of time from the 
establishment of democracy these values cease to affect LRI to a significant 
degree in new democracies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010, Evans and 
Whitefield 1998, Kitschelt et al. 1995). Democratic values are studied in most 
of the empirical articles with the expectation that their role in affecting LRI in 
new democracies is temporary and that they do not constitute LRI as such. 
 
 
Left-Right Identification and Country Level Variables 
In a few cases previous research has confirmed differences between countries’ 
population’s LRI, especially in people’s ability to position themselves on the LR 
dimension, but probable direct and interactional effects of country and other 
macro level factors which are already briefly referred to earlier in this section 
are not sufficiently studied. The need for research that includes macro level 
variables besides individual level variables is also expressed by several authors 
(such as by Jou 2010a: 182, and Geser 2008: 18). 
This dissertation focuses on LRI in democratic countries and the comparison 
between old, long-consolidated democracies and new democracies is one of the 
most important aspects in studying development of ideological identification. 
Level of democracy as a ground for comparing countries LRI – old versus new 
democracies, Western Europe versus Eastern Europe, or different regions, etc. – 
is common (among others Dalton 2006, Geser 2008, Jou 2010a), but studies 
which investigate the age of democracy itself as a predictor are rather rare. As 
Weber (2010: 7) put it, however, it is not the time of democratic experience but 
the time to get used to and to understand the political concept that is important 
here. We can expect that with the switch to democracy it would take some time 
for residents to get used to the new political system and landscape, and several 
studies confirm this – a population’s ability to locate themselves on the LR 
dimension increases within democratic experience (Jou 2010a, Dalton 2006, 
Freire 2006b, and more precisely Freire 2008: 198), although citizens of new 
democracies are surprisingly good and quick at locating themselves ideo-
logically after the collapse of the authoritarian regime (McAllister and White 
2007, Dalton 2006). The ability to identify ideologically may also be expressed 
in the clear anchoring in LRI of values and social structure – at the beginning of 
the new democratic regime people do not relate specific values, issues and 
parties with the ideological dimension, but after some learning period they do, 
although in this case the party system also plays an important structuring role 
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(Jou 2010d, Freire 2008, Freire 2015). The effect of democratic experience as 
part of the development of political discourse will be addressed in all the 
empirical studies of this dissertation. 
The democratic development of a society is directly related to the legacy of 
the authoritarian system that preceded the democratic system. Legacies of 
authoritarian regimes are a rather rarely studied field, but a few scholars, Pop-
Eleches and Tucker, for instance, have started to examine the nature of 
authoritarian legacy in more detail9. There are also some findings from former 
research about post-communist countries worth emphasising here. First, studies 
confirm that although the ability to locate oneself on the LR dimension might be 
slightly lower among the populations from post-communist societies compared 
to Western European democracies they are familiar with the concept (Jou 
2010a, Dalton 2006 among many). The assumption that longevity or severity of 
authoritarian rule might result in a lower ability to identify ideologically is also 
disproved by Jou (2013: 285–6).  
Second, some specific tendencies and deviations from Western democracies 
have been confirmed in post-communist countries. Economic conflict is 
reflected on the LR dimension in a similar way to Western democracies (those 
who support equality and redistribution are leftist), although the association is 
weaker (Dalton 2006, Jou 2010a, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010), but the 
conflict between liberal and conservative values or between supporting a change 
versus maintaining the status quo is often related to LRI in contrast to the 
West – conservative values and maintaining the old system are associated with 
the Left, not the Right. The direction of the association varies across countries 
and over time, but it is broadly adopted that post-communist populations deviate 
somewhat from the conventional understanding of Left and Right (Jou 2010a, 
Kitschelt 1992, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). The cause for the deviance is 
usually seen hidden in historical circumstances – in Western Europe democracy 
originated from monarchies; in post-communist countries democracy was 
preceded by a system whose official ideology was extreme Left, communism, 
and as a reaction to the old system in the West the change and liberalism was 
related to the Left, while in post-communist countries it was related to the 
Right.  
There are mainly two issues that have been raised concerning the 
authoritarian background of new democracies. First, a need to consider more 
precisely the effect of authoritarian background on LRI, for instance by Jou 
(2008, 2010: 24); and second, the longevity of the effect of authoritarian 
background, raised again by Jou (2008). Recent findings from post-communist 
countries have confirmed a changed, now positive link between social liberal 
values and leftist views in Estonia (Kivistik 2016), which may refer to the fact 
that perceptions of Left and Right can change over time. Although Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker (2010) have not examined change in the value content of Left and 
                                                            
9  For a discussion about possible authoritarian legacies see Pop-Eleches (2007), Pop-
Eleches and Tucker (2010) and Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011). 
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Right in detail, but ideological positioning in post-communist countries, they 
have found that the understanding of LRI in post-communist space approaches 
Western European understanding as political and economic institutions converge. 
The Left becomes less despised by educated and democratically-inclined people 
and Western style social democratic parties and far-right parties become more 
popular. At the same time, Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2016) found that people 
in post-communist countries tend to have anti-Left bias and people from former 
right-wing authoritarian countries tend to have anti-Right bias; but as anti-Right 
bias disappears through learning after a while – as the average position of the 
population on the LR dimension corresponds to (neutral) Western countries – 
anti-Left bias still exists and is especially remarkable among younger cohorts in 
post-communist countries. At the same time, older cohorts in post-communist 
societies have been rather neutral and comparable to their Western counterparts 
since the democratic transition. 
In new democracies with a right-wing authoritarian background – in Latin 
America where the authoritarian background is less continuous (Jou 2010a), and 
especially in East Asia – LRI is frequently less structured and more dubious 
compared to Western developed societies. However, unlike in the case of post-
communist countries, clear deviations from or contradictions to Western meaning 
of Left and Right are not observed (Jou 2010a, Dalton 2006, Wiesehomeier and 
Doyle 2012).  
Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) have also argued that in the case of post-
communist societies an individual’s experience during the transition was a more 
important factor affecting ideological identification than authoritarian legacy 
itself. The winners of the transition, usually the young, educated and demo-
cratically engaged people were rightist, and scholars assume that that this trend 
will disappear after some democratic experience (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
2010: 26). 
Considering notable differences between post-communist, other newly 
democratised and long consolidated Western European countries, the authori-
tarian legacy of new democracies is at the focus of the dissertation. The main 
assumption is that the (ideological) authoritarian legacy affects how people in 
new democratic societies understand the concepts of Left and Right and that 
usually it can be explained through opposing the former authoritarian system 
together with its ideology.  
In addition to political development, the economic and social development 
of society can also affect LRI. The level of socio-economic development of a 
society is associated with LRI mainly in two ways. First, as more educated 
people identify themselves on the LR scale more often at individual level, there 
is good reason to expect that education has a similar compatible effect also at 
the country level. Thus, social development translated into the educational level 
of population should bring with it people’s ability to identify oneself on the LR 
dimension – in more developed societies LRI is more relevant.  
Second, a considerable number of scholars support Inglehart’s claim that 
economic development and improving economic conditions lead to a value shift 
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to post-materialist values and this shift has already occurred in Western Europe 
and other most developed societies. Therefore, in socio-economically more 
developed countries conflict between old materialist and new post-materialist 
values has appeared. Studies on less developed countries show a tendency that 
post-materialist values are yet not related to LRI there (Rivero 2004, Jou 2010a, 
Geser 2008) whereas in more developed Western European countries they are 
(Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Potter 2001). There has been a 
debate whether the new conflict replaces the old one or whether it will be 
absorbed into LR conflict. Empirical evidence supports rather a claim about the 
emergence of post-materialist values in developed Western democracies and 
usually indicates that new value conflict will be reflected as an additional one 
on LRI, instead of replacing the old value conflict (Jou 2010a, Kitschelt and 
Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Freire 2006a). Because of those two reasons – 
affecting the ability to identify ideologically and leading to post-materialist 
values – the socio-economic level of societies is included in the empirical 
studies of this dissertation. 
In addition to the political and social development of societies, the influence 
of parties and the party system on LRI is worth pointing out. Although fre-
quently the quantity of parties is deemed an important aspect in political 
research, Dalton (2008) argues that the quality of the party system or party 
(ideological) polarisation is more important here. In a polarised party system 
parties are distributed over an ideological dimension so that citizens are able to 
differentiate their stances clearly, and this facilitates citizens’ positioning on the 
LR dimension (Dalton 2008, van der Eijk, Schmitt & Binder 2005, Jou 2011). 
Instability associated with new party systems is also emphasised as a reason for 
a lower level of LR recognition by citizens in new democracies (Gunther and 
Kuan 2007, Freire 2006a, Mainwaring and Torcal 2005). In addition, values and 
issues are more clearly related to LRI when a party system is well developed – 
polarised and with well-established partisan identities with low level of 
volatility (Zechmeister and Corral 2013, Freire 2008). In Latin America, 
Zechmeister and Corral (2013: 688) have found that even the meaning of Left 
and Right is dependent on polarisation – when polarisation is high, a limited 
role for the state is related to the Right, but when polarisation is low it is related 
to the Left, which suggests that higher polarisation leads to a better conceptual 
understanding of LR ideology (confirmed also by Huber 1989). Several studies 
(Dalton 2008, Lachat 2008, Van der Eijk, Schmitt and Binder 2005, Freire 
2015) have also found that ideological voting is stronger in the context of higher 
polarisation. Party system related factors – party polarisation and clarity of party 
alternatives – are examined in the present dissertation in order to examine their 
effect on people’s ability to identify ideologically and on value anchoring in 
LRI.  
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Effects of Left-Right Identification  
In order to evaluate the effects of LRI I will study how LRI affects other pheno-
mena in the political landscape. LRI is a central concept in political science, 
playing an important role in many situations and it has been seen to affect a 
variety of political phenomena. LRI predicts the choice of party in elections and 
support for coalition and government, but often also support for the democratic 
system in general. The LRI of a person is also an indicator of their preferences 
in everyday politics and public discussion – whether it is immigration and 
refugee issues, budget and tax issues, foreign policy or moral issues. As this 
dissertation, however, is focused on studying the determinants of LRI, and just 
one empirical article concerns the effect of LRI, only the most important effects 
of LRI are presented in the following section.  
The effect of LRI is covered in most voting studies and those studies confirm 
LRI as being one of the major predictors of voting, with leftist citizens voting 
for social democrats, etc. (Franklin et al 1992, Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, 
Gunther and Montero 2001, Hix 1999, Knutsen 1997, Van der Eijk et al 2005). 
The psychological approach to voting behaviour especially established that ideo-
logical identification on the LR scale orientates and anchors voting (Inglehart 
and Klingemann 1976, Percheron and Jennings 1981, Fleury and Lewis-Beck 
1993). Rational choice theory has also suggested that ideology enables 
individuals to reduce the costs associated with a need to learn about different 
policy proposals; and thus, LR ideology becomes a centrepiece of competition 
between parties to win the support of voters (Downs 1957, Listhaugh et al. 1994). 
The effect of the ideological identification may vary, for instance, in new 
democracies, where the political landscape and party identities are less 
developed and citizens’ ideological preferences are less structured, so the 
impact of LRI on voting is weaker. Empirical studies are controversial – in the 
Latin American case some scholars (Seligson 2007, Azpuru 2010) have found a 
significant relationship between LRI and party choice, while others have 
questioned this (Echegfalteraray 2005, Weyland 2003). LRI also noticeably 
affects voting in post-communist countries, especially among older cohorts, but 
again as usually, East Asia is distinctive in demonstrating very low levels of LR 
voting (Jou 2010a: 155–6, 178). Moreover, although voting is a central part of 
politics and political science and is clearly affected by LRI, the effect of LRI on 
voting is not studied in this dissertation as the aim of this dissertation is related 
to wider concepts which are relevant in the case of new democracies, such as 
support for democracy.  
In addition to vote choice, LRI, or more widely LR ideology, can also 
predict the issue preferences at the individual level and the policy preferences of 
government at the national level. Although this dissertation does not study how 
LRI affects issue preferences, the main assumptions and findings in this area are 
worth pointing out as LRI facilitates the adoption of a position on more specific 
political issues, being cost effective in terms of time and energy. There is a wide 
range of issues that has been linked as being at least partly predictable from the 
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ideological position of people, among many, foreign policy, immigration, 
taxation, etc. Thereby, right-wing people are more militant than left-wing people 
(Martini 201210) and more negatively disposed towards immigrants (Hix and 
Noury 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), although Hainmueller and 
Hopkins (2014: 244) highlight the need for more thorough studies on the latter. 
Todosijević (2004: 426) confirmed in the Hungarian case that although there 
exist differences in the strength of the relationship between LRI and political 
preferences at the elite and mass level, and though among the elite the 
explanatory power of ideological identification is higher, LRI clearly predicts 
preferences on political issues among the entire population.  
In addition to a clear link between LRI and political preferences there is an 
alternative way to evaluate whether citizens’ ideological preferences have any 
impact on policy – congruence between positions hold by publics and govern-
ment. Jou (2010: 164) confirmed that generally, with few exceptions (Spain and 
Czech Republic in this case), government positions weakly reflect people’s 
positions, but the impact is less robust in post-communist countries compared to 
Western Europe.11  
The effect of LRI that will be empirically examined in this dissertation is 
support for democratic principles and the democratic system as these reflect the 
acceptance of the new system and the existence of democratic political capital, 
which are critical to new democracies to survive. LRI is associated with several 
attitudes, such as support for democratic principles, satisfaction with democracy 
and satisfaction with life. The claims presented here overlap at least partially 
with those presented in the previous section on determinants.  
First, democracy as a principle is universally approved and supported in 
established democracies, but in new democracies support for democracy is not 
so prevalent (Ehin 2007, for instance) and especially in the early years after 
transition in post-communist countries (above all leftist) people are less attached 
to the principles of democracy (Kivistik 2007: 61). The relationship between 
LRI and support for democracy occurs in most other new democracies (Moreno 
1999, Shin and Jhee 2005), although only in case of Arab countries is its nature 
similar to that found in post-communist countries (Dalton 2006). 
Both satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with life reflect people’s 
general satisfaction. In mature democracies satisfaction and ideological 
identification should be linked as follows – leftist people are more satisfied with 
life and the political system when leftist parties are governing, and the opposite 
is true when rightist parties form a government. However, empirical findings 
confirm the rather weak tendency of rightist people being more satisfied with 
democracy (Anderson and Singer 2008, Lühiste 2014). Anderson and Singer 
(2008: 583) believe that the reason why rightist people tend to be more satisfied 
                                                            
10  He tested an impact of ideology in US and used liberal-conservative dimension.  
11  Congruence between parties’ ideology and government policy is also well studied (see 
Imbeau et al 2001 for overview), however post-communist countries show contradictory 
results again (Tavits and Letki 2009).  
31 
with democracy could be a result of leftist citizens being less likely to accept 
authority and the status quo than rightist ones. 
In new democracies, a stronger association between LRI and satisfaction has 
been found. In post-communist societies, leftist people are the dissatisfied ones 
and rightist the satisfied ones, and several authors have suggested that 
satisfaction in those societies is not related to government ideology and policy 
but to the individual experience of winning or losing with democratic transition 
(Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010). When European countries from both camps are 
included into the analysis, a weak link between rightist views and satisfaction 
with democracy manifests (Lühiste 2014: 794).  
Curini et al. (2014: 144) challenge previous research in finding a curvilinear 
relationship between LRI and life satisfaction – those who locate themselves as 
extreme leftist or rightist are more satisfied than centrists. They also discover 
that centrists are more satisfied with life the closer they are to their government 
in ideological manner, but citizens with more extreme views are rather more 
dissatisfied the closer they are to their government. It means that when most 
people prefer convergence between the views of government and their own, 
extremists might prefer a feeling of isolated ideological purity.  
In this dissertation, I rely on earlier findings from new democracies and 
expect, as previously pointed out, that association between LRI and support for 
democracy is noticeable after the collapse of the authoritarian regime but loses 
its importance over time. 
 
 
Scope and Contribution of the Dissertation             
The objective of the dissertation is to examine both country and individual level 
determinants of LRI and the effect of LRI in countries with different political 
trajectories in order to evaluate the relevance and content of LRI. This 
dissertation is composed of five empirical research articles which try to fill the 
gaps and extend the research in two ways – in encompassing a larger variety of 
countries into one study by doing longitudinal comparative studies and in 
broadening a circle of factors by focusing on country level variables. 
Studies on LRI have so far focused more on individual level variables – be it 
social demographics, values or party identification – and covered one or few 
rather similar countries in a study. There are, of course, exceptions, like Dalton 
(2006) and Jou (2010), who have studied a larger variety of countries, but they 
have been confined to a comparison of country correlations. This is largely a 
result of lack of data – there exist no comparable survey data about longer 
periods and a variety of countries which include enough relevant variables for 
studying LRI. However, it at least partially also reflects the state of the art of 
political science research, where new analytical and statistical methods like 
multilevel regression analysis have rather recently been introduced and there-
fore the corresponding research is only starting to become more popular in 
recent years (Zechmeister and Corral 2013, for instance). The reason for more 
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combined research may also be inspired from the introducing of more inter-
disciplinary studies and the engaging of factors from different research fields.  
To increase the variety of countries in an analysis, my research approaches 
LRI in two different ways. Some of the dissertation’s articles include many 
(new) democracies the world over and sacrifice an in-depth analysis for a 
general comparison when using worldwide surveys. In other articles, instead of 
including only countries from the same region, a few countries from very 
different contexts are compared by exploiting the data of the origins of various 
surveys. Thus it is possible to consider context and country factors and much 
better understand the possible reasons for differences.  
This dissertation covers several other country level factors and individual 
level factors as well, but the main focus and contribution is the examination of 
the effects of a country’s democratic experience and the authoritarian back-
ground on LRI. Studying the development of LRI in new democracies is one of 
the best ways to study the relevance (whether LRI makes sense everywhere), 
and content of LRI (whether there exists clear meaning of it), and for evaluating 
which theory best describes LRI. For this, in the study of different new 
democracies it is necessary to cover as long a period of time as possible. There 
may be several criteria or relevant characteristics of new democracies that may 
affect the development of LRI, but the main criterion for this research – having 
an authoritarian background – was chosen based on the results of the last two 
decades of research. This emphasises post-communist countries’ deviation in 
LRI (Kitschelt 1995, Rockey 2009, Jost et al 2009, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
2010, Jou 2010a), which has cast some doubt on the universality and usefulness 
of the labels of “Left” and “Right”. For comparison, this dissertation also 
includes long consolidated Western democracies. 
The contribution of my dissertation’s publications is three-fold: 
1. First, the publications that constitute this dissertation study LRI in countries 
with very different political and cultural background and evaluate how the 
use and content of LRI varies across countries. In doing so, the dissertation 
evaluates the relevance of the concept and seeks to identify a common core 
in value content of LRI, and it also contributes to theoretical understanding 
of LRI by assessing the appropriateness of four proposed theories in 
explaining LRI.  
2. Second, the publications examine how an abstract concept like LRI is 
learned by people and how the content and meaning of it has developed 
over the years, and contribute thus to the understanding of more general 
process of political socialisation and concept-construction. 
3. Third, the publications introduce and examine the effects of country-level 
variables, which have to date been understudied and therefore improve our 
empirical understanding of how contextual factors affect LRI. 
 
In studying the relevance and the content of LRI this dissertation tries to 
evaluate among other things which theory – irrelevance, transformation, per-
sistence or pluralisation – best applies to LRI. Relevance is operationalised in 
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two ways – as LR recognition through ability to locate oneself on the LR scale 
and as LR value anchoring through strength of values anchored to LRI. The 
content of LRI is operationalised through a nature of relationship between 
values and LRI. The publications about the relevance of LRI which are part of 
this dissertation can confirm or reject the irrelevance theory and studies about 
value content of LRI can give some evidence for supporting one of those three 
remaining theories about the nature of LR identification. Besides, one study 
treats LRI as an independent variable by studying its effect on support for 
democracy/democratic values; by doing so it can indirectly also confirm the 
relevance of the concept. 
 
The dissertation consists of five publications (see Table 1), four of which treat 
LRI as dependent variable and one as independent variable, which address the 
following research questions: 
1. The first study explores the relevance of LRI by studying which individual 
and macro level variables explain LR cognition and the cognition of party 
LR positioning on five continents.  
2. The second study explores the relevance and content of LRI and studies 
which values and macro level variables explain LRI on four continents.  
3. The third study explores the effect of LRI and studies how LRI explains 
support for democracy in new democracies. 
4. The fourth study explores the relevance of LRI and studies whether LR 
anchoring on values at the mass level is more dependent on LR party system 
polarisation, clear LR government alternatives and important cross-cutting 
cleavages or authoritarian legacies in new democracies.  
5. The fifth study explores the content of LRI and studies which values are 
related to LRI and how it is affected by the ideology of the former authori-
tarian regime and democratic longevity in new democracies. 
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Table 1. Topics, dependent variables and main expectations of the publications 
 I  II  III  IV  V  
Topic Relevance of 
LRI 
Relevance and 
content of LRI 
Effect of LRI Relevance and 
content of LRI 
Content of LRI 
Depen-
dent 
variable 
(1) Ability to 
place oneself on 
LR scale,  
 
(2) Ability to 
place parties on 
LR scale 
 
LR self-placement
 
(1) Support for 
democratic 
principles,  
 
(2) support for 
democratic 
regime/system,  
 
(3) trust in 
institutions  
Relationship 
between LR 
self-placement 
and values 
 
 
LR self-
placement 
 
Indepen-
dent 
macro 
variables 
Democratic 
longevity 
social 
development  
party size 
Democratic 
longevity 
clarity of party 
alternatives 
West vs other 
societies 
 
Authoritarian past 
 
 
Authoritarian 
past 
LR 
governmental 
alternation 
party 
polarisation  
Authoritarian 
past  
democratic 
longevity 
 
Main 
expec-
tations 
(a) Sophisticated 
(educated, 
politically-
interested, 
informed, older, 
with party 
identification) 
people better 
recognise the 
terms LR 
 
(b) People in 
socially and 
democratically-
developed 
countries and in 
more polarised 
party systems 
better recognise 
the terms LR 
(a) Support for the 
law and order, 
traditional moral 
values, greater 
individual 
initiative in the 
economy, 
privatisation, 
reduced taxes and 
materialist values 
is positively 
related to the 
Right 
 
(b) Democratic 
development and 
greater clarity of 
party alternatives 
is positively 
related to the 
greater value 
anchoring of LR 
(c) Non-Western 
value conflicts 
reveal more in 
countries outside 
West (Asia, 
Africa, Latin 
America) 
(a) In countries with 
different 
authoritarian 
background the 
direction of 
relationship between 
support for 
democracy and LRI 
is reverse 
 
(b) Ideological 
polarisation is 
strengthening impact 
of LRI on support 
for democracy 
 
(c) Support for 
democracy is higher 
among younger, 
educated, with 
higher income 
people, urban 
residents and ethnic 
majority 
representatives 
 
(d) Differences in 
support for 
democracy disappear 
over time 
LR anchoring 
in values is 
greater in more 
polarised LR 
party systems 
and in greater 
LR government 
alternatives  
 
(a) Impact of 
economic values 
on LRI 
strengthens over 
time 
 
(b) Influence of 
social and 
post-materialist 
values on LRI is 
reverse in 
post-communist 
societies but that 
will change over 
time 
 
(c) Democratic 
values have an 
influence on LRI 
after democratic 
transition but it 
disappears over 
time 
(2 biggest) 
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The aim of the first publication is to examine how individual level sophistication 
factors and country level factors, which should increase people’s understanding 
of political and abstract world, affect people’s recognition of LRI. The study 
encompasses a rather limited number of countries but the sample contains great 
variability in terms of democratic and social background, from the US to 
Mozambique. The study explores the first exposure to LRI – whether people 
locate themselves on the LR scale when asked, and thus reflects the relevance of 
LRI. Though people may locate themselves on the scale without having clear 
opinions on ideological terms and locating might be a result of socially-desired 
behaviour, for example, empirical evidence confirms that recognition levels of 
LRI are generally higher in advanced democracies12.  
Therefore, an ability to locate oneself on the LR scale can be treated as a 
measure for the relevance of LRI. If the expectations of the study are met (more 
sophisticated people in more developed societies locate themselves on the LR 
scale), we have a reason to expect that over time in more democratically 
developed societies and among more sophisticated citizens the concept of LR is 
more, rather than less, recognised and thus relevance of it should rather increase.  
The relevance of LR identification is also studied in other publications (II, 
IV), where it is operationalised as value anchoring in LRI. Here again, the focus 
is on macro level factors – how authoritarian background and democratic 
transition explain the strength of relationship between values and LRI. These 
studies enable us to examine whether the relevance of LRI is more affected by 
the legacy of the past, by politicisation of the issues or by democratic develop-
ment as such. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate that LRI can be relevant 
among countries with a different level of democratic experience and with 
different cultures, and that the relevance of LRI should not be questioned only 
because LRI does not carry similar conflict or content everywhere, but rather its 
value lies in describing the most important political/value conflicts in societies.  
The content of LRI is examined the most in-depth in two publications (II, V) 
and in less detail in one more (IV). These studies focus on the value content of 
LRI and address three aspects of it. First, they examine how values that are 
associated with LRI in Western consolidated democracies, i.e. “Western 
template” values, are manifested around the world (II) and especially in new 
democracies (V). Second, they explore which values besides “Western template” 
emerge outside of Western countries and among new democracies. Third, they 
explain how country level factors, like democratic development, authoritarian 
background (V), and clarity of LR party alternatives (II, IV) influence the value 
content of LRI. In studying the content of LRI, we can evaluate which of three 
theories describes value content the best – whether the value content of LRI is 
persistent, transforming or diversifying. Better comprehension of the content of 
the concept enables us to take advantage of the simplifying and predictive 
power of LRI as pointed out by Savage (2012). 
                                                            
12  Here the most deviating cases are East Asian societies, which demonstrate higher levels 
of LR recognition than any other society.  
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One publication (III) does not address the relevance and content of LRI 
directly but studies the effect of LRI on support for democracy and addresses 
the relevance of LRI, as an important factor in explaining regime support, 
indirectly. The importance of the last phenomenon – sufficient level of democratic 
support for establishing the new regime – is highlighted especially in case of 
new democracies, where the popular support is generally lower compared to 
developed democracies (Lühiste 2008, Mishler and Rose 1996). The publication 
explores the effect of authoritarian legacy on the impact of citizens’ LRI on 
regime support by comparing three countries with a communist legacy and three 
countries with right-wing authoritarian legacy over a 20–30 year period.  
 
 
Data and Methods  
First, the most important methods used by political scientists to measure LRI 
are shortly introduced and thereafter the methods and data used in this 
dissertation are introduced.  
There are different ways in political science research to measure Left and 
Right. To measure the placement of parties on the LR scale, three main methods 
are used. First, expert surveys on party positions (the first study using those 
surveys was undertaken by Castles and Mair 1984, also Benoit and Laver 2007, 
Wiesehomeier 2010, just to mention a few), which let national experts to assess 
the parties’ locations on the Left-Right scale, are common. Second, coding party 
election manifesto content for categories, distinguishing these characteristics by 
Left and Right (used by Laver and Budge 1992, Budge 1994, Klingemann et al 
1994, Jahn 2010, for example) can be undertaken. In the frame of this method 
the most popular and leading approach is the Party Manifesto Group coding 
scheme, which contains a considerable number of party manifestos over time 
and across countries. And third, the surveys, such as the European Social 
Survey, where people are requested to evaluate the parties’ locations on the LR 
scale, are also used to make judgements about parties’ ideological identification 
(used by Le Gall and Berton 2013, for instance). 
Several methods are used to measure the LRI of the population as well. First 
is the most popular method, which is also used in this dissertation, is measuring 
LRI by survey question asking people to place themselves on the LR scale, 
usually on a 10-point or 11-point scale. This question is included in most surveys 
carried out in the world – e.g. World Values Survey, European Value Study, 
European Social Survey, European Election Study, Barometer studies, national 
electoral surveys, etc. Second, the most frequently used method to study 
citizens’ ideological identification is use of open-ended questions where people 
are requested to define the labels “Left” and “Right” (used by Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990). There are also some less common methods for studying the 
content of Left and Right. One of them is the q-method, which is used by 
Elizabeth Zechmeister (2006), for instance. All of those methods have also been 
used to measure elites’ ideological positions, and the results show that 
37 
compared to the masses, the elites’ understanding of the terms of Left and Right 
is more profound (Freire and Belchior 2013).  
All five empirical publications constituting this dissertation combine indi-
vidual level survey data with country level data. The data and methods are 
presented in Table 2 below. The surveys in use are the Comparative National 
Elections Project (CNEP) from 1992–2007 (I, II), the World Values Survey/ 
European Value Study from (WVS/EVS) 1990–2014 (III, IV, V), and “The 
Political culture of Southern Europe – A Four Nation study” (1985) (III, IV). To 
measure country level variables, data from Polity IV (I, II), Freedom House 
index (V) (for age of democracy) and the Freedom House index of overall press 
freedom (for freedom of press) (I) are used. Other country level variables – 
party size, level of education in a country (I), clarity of party alternatives (II) 
and party polarisation (IV) – are composed from survey data. 
The first two publications (I, II) include both new and consolidated 
democracies from all over the world – Africa, America, Asia and Europe. The 
remaining three publications (III, IV, V) include only new democracies: the first 
two (III, IV) include six countries from South and East Europe – Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – and the third one (V) includes a 
larger variety of countries from around the world – South and East Europe, East 
Asia and Latin America.  
All five empirical studies use regression analysis, but there are also 
important differences among them, especially at the macro level of the analysis. 
Most of the studies, except the first, which uses logistic regression analysis, use 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Four studies (I–IV) report 
country-specific regression results, while the fifth study (IV) includes all 
countries in the same analysis. In addition, the first two studies (I–II) apply two-
step hierarchical regression employing regression coefficients from the first 
(individual level) step as dependent variables in the second (macro level) step. 
The third study (III) compares the OLS regression results of six countries, 
taking into account their different context and background.  
In the fourth study (IV), principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to 
create value factors that will afterwards be related to LR identification. The 
level of value anchoring of the LR identification in each country, measured as 
explanation power (R2), is treated as a dependent variable at the second level of 
the analysis, where the influence of authoritarian legacy, party system pola-
risation and governmental alternation on LR value anchoring will be analysed. 
The fifth study (V) uses OLS regression analysis for every 5-year period, 
distinguishing countries by their authoritarian background and multilevel OLS 
regression analysis with three-way interactions with macro level variables to 
control the robustness of the results. 
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Table 2. Data and methods of publications 
 I II III IV V 
Data Comparative 
National 
Elections Project 
I–III (years) 
14 countries 
from five 
continents 
Comparative 
National 
Elections 
Project I–III 
13/ 6 countries 
from four 
continents 
World Values 
Survey/Europea
n Value Study 
1990–2008, 
“The Political 
Culture of 
Southern 
Europe – A 
Four Nation 
Study” (1985), 
6 countries 
(Greece, 
Portugal, Spain 
and Estonia, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania) 
World Values 
Survey/Europea
n Value Study 
1990–2008, 
“The Political 
Culture of 
Southern Europe 
– A Four Nation 
Study” (1985),  
6 countries 
(Greece, 
Portugal, Spain 
and Estonia, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania) 
World Values 
Survey/European 
Value Study 
1990–2014 
approx. 30 
countries  
Method Two-step 
hierarchical 
regression, 
logistic 
regression for 
each country at 
the individual 
level. 
Regression 
coefficients from 
the first step are 
considered as 
dependent 
variables in the 
second step. 
Two-step 
hierarchical 
regression, OLS 
regression for 
each country at 
the individual 
level. 
Regression 
coefficients 
from the first 
step are 
considered as 
dependent 
variables in the 
second step. 
Multivariate 
OLS 
regressions for 
each country at 
the individual 
level.  
Multivariate 
OLS regressions 
for each country 
at the individual 
level and at the 
macro level. 
Principal 
component 
analysis (PCA) 
for creating 
value factors. 
OLS regression 
analysis at the 
individual level 
and multilevel 
regression 
analysis with 
three-way 
interactions with 
individual and 
macro level 
variables 
included. 
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Main Findings  
First, I will give a brief overview of the main findings of each article separately 
and then I will present the major findings on the relevance, content and effect of 
LRI.  
The main findings from the study “Mapping and Explaining the Use of the 
Left-Right Divide” (I) confirm that LR recognition (for people and for parties) is 
more socially and politically determined at the individual level in long 
consolidated democracies and in countries with more freedom of press. There 
are reasons to expect some convergence between countries when younger 
democratic regimes (from non-Western parts of the world) will be more 
consolidated, when there will be more freedom of the press, and when the level 
of social development will be higher. 
The main findings from the study “Western and non-Western meanings of 
the Left-Right divide across four continents” (II) confirm that in addition to 
lower level of LR anchoring on the Western template of values, outside Western 
Europe and North America (excluding Argentina, Uruguay and Portugal), 
‘western values’ also have an opposite impact compared to that which they have 
in the West. The analysis also confirms that democratic experience (as age of 
the democratic regime) is more important than party polarisation in affecting the 
value anchoring. 
The main findings from the study “Authoritarian legacies and mass left-right 
regime support in new democracies: the BS and SE compared” (III) show that 
the relationships between LR self-positioning and regime evaluations are 
important after democratic transition. Rightist people in the Baltic States share 
more negative evaluations of the previous regimes and more support for the 
democratic regime, and the reverse applies to South European countries. In 
addition, the associations remain significant – although they are weakening – 
for the evaluation of authoritarian regimes, but almost completely disappear in 
terms of diffuse democratic support during the democratic period.  
The main findings from the study “Regime transition, value conflicts and the 
left-right divide at the mass level: The BS and SE compared” (IV) suggest that 
the importance of right-wing voter alignments and political parties in the Baltic 
States, especially in Estonia and Latvia, and the notable importance of left-wing 
voter alignments and political parties in Southern Europe can be treated as 
legacies of different authoritarian pasts. The analysis also confirms that although 
the type of authoritarian legacy was important in affecting LR anchoring, the type 
of democratic transition, and especially the political alliances and party-poli-
ticisation of the issues during the regime’s formative years, were even more 
important.  
The main findings from the study “Influence of Authoritarian Background 
on Value Content of the Left-Right Identification in New Democracies, 1994–
2014” (V) confirm that the value content of LRI is developing and changing in 
new democracies. While initially, attitudes towards democracy shape LRI, 
support for democracy becomes detached from ideological orientation after a 
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few decades from transition. Economic values constitute ideological identi-
fication, with a few exceptions, in a similar manner in new and old democracies, 
and the conflicting effect of social liberal and post-materialist values on LRI 
among societies with different authoritarian background disappears over time. 
The relevance of LRI was studied in several publications. The first study 
confirmed that individual level sophistication factors have an impact on LR 
recognition everywhere, except that the impact of sophistication factors is 
greater in more democratically and socially developed countries. The latter 
result could refer to more reflective LR positioning in those countries and to 
more “false centrists” in democratically and socially less developed countries. 
In countries with more press freedom, education has a stronger impact on LR 
recognition and in more educated societies the person’s age has a stronger 
influence on LR recognition. Macro level factors, like age of democratic regime 
and freedom of press, also enhance the overall level of LR recognition in a 
country. 
The findings from the other studies about relevance of LR identification (II, 
IV) are two-fold. In comparing the Baltic States with Southern European 
countries, the results confirm that authoritarian legacy affects positioning on LR 
dimension – right-wing identification is predominant in the Baltic States, and 
the opposite is notable in Southern Europe. However, value anchoring in LRI is 
more affected by the nature of the democratic transition – in countries with 
more polarised party systems and with bigger clarity of LR, government 
alternatives values are more clearly associated with LRI. The study encom-
passing countries over the world confirms that both issue politicisation and age 
of the democracy have a clear positive effect on value anchoring in LRI, but the 
impact of the latter is even greater. The current results refer to a trend that 
relevance of LRI in terms of being closely associated with values increases with 
democratic development and therefore also in present new democracies the 
relevance of LRI is expected to grow in the future. 
The studies about the value content of LRI reflect a large variability across 
countries. Although “Western” values are associated with LRI in most of the 
countries, the association is stronger and clearer in Western consolidated de-
mocracies. In new democracies, especially with a communist legacy and those 
farther from Western influence, the direction of the association in some cases 
even contrasts with the conventional Western one. Some examples of such 
deviations include: in former communist Baltic States, post-materialist values 
constructed a value factor with socio-economic Right values in the first decade 
of democracy in 1996–99 (IV); people supporting equal distribution in wealth 
incline to the Right in several countries – Uruguay, Argentina, South Africa; 
and those who support public enterprises incline to the Right in countries like 
Chile, Hungary and Mozambique (II). It is also worth mentioning that 
association between LRI and economic values is more stable and varies less 
across societies than the association between LRI and social values. The less 
stable association between the latter can at least partially arise from using 
different survey questions and from the trend that social values which are 
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acceptable (or where conflict may appear) can strongly depend on societies’ 
other developmental aspects, such as the level of education. 
Besides contrasting associations, LRI has some untraditional value content 
in less developed democracies. For instance, LRI is clearly related to support for 
democracy in most new democracies after a democratic transition (V). Another 
study (II) shows that we can find values, like openness to foreign influence 
(although this has an effect also in the US) in Argentina, accepting conflicts in 
South Africa, and supporting secular law and communitarianism in Mozam-
bique related to rightist ideological positions. This means that in less developed 
democracies there are wider circle of values, which may constitute an important 
value content of LRI. 
An inclusion of country level factors has proven to be valuable. First, an 
effect of authoritarian background on value content of LRI is confirmed in two 
studies (IV, V). Findings confirm that authoritarian background, or to be more 
precise, the ideology of the former authoritarian regime, does not influence so 
much the strength of association between values and LRI as a direction of the 
same. In particular, in former communist countries socially tolerant and post-
materialist people incline to the Right after democratic transition in contrary to 
their counterparts in former right-authoritarian or long consolidated demo-
cracies. The same contrast is evident in support for democracy. However, when 
we include age of democracy in an analysis, we see that after about twenty 
years of democracy these differences mostly vanish, and economic and social 
values are related to LRI in such way that economic liberalism and social 
conservatism go hand in hand with the Right (IV, V). In more developed 
societies post-materialist values complement economic and social ones in 
diversifying the value content (V). In general, the age of the democracy helps 
along “Western” – economic and social – values anchoring in LRI. Thus, 
generally, we could conclude that there is persistent value content of LRI which 
is economic and a bit lesser degree social in nature, but the content can be 
diversified by some less central values, such as post-materialist ones. At the 
same time, it is worth underlining that although democratic development tends 
to go hand in hand with economic development and social development and 
lead to similar understanding of LRI, these processes may unfold at different 
speeds and we cannot expect similar value content of LRI in every society.  
Incorporating party-level factors, such as LR governmental alternation and 
party polarisation (IV) or the clarity of party alternatives (II), has proven to be 
valuable as well. The findings confirm that the level of polarization and the 
clarity of party alternatives have a significant impact on LRI, because values 
and issues are more clearly related to LRI when a party system is polarised and 
the government can be composed of either leftist or rightist parties. Some (see 
e.g. Dalton 2006) have argued that democratic development favours less 
extreme parties and ideological positions, which means that parties converge in 
the middle of the LR scale. This tendency taken together with the finding that 
polarisation affects value anchoring in LRI predicts the decreasing relevance of 
LRI, which goes against my earlier expectation regarding a continuous 
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democratisation process. It would, then, be interesting to see whether LRI has 
lost its relevance in a decade or two from now. 
The publication about the effect of LRI (III) shows that in cases of 
evaluation of authoritarian regimes and of democratic diffuse support, authori-
tarian legacy has a significant impact. In the Baltic States, support for demo-
cracy and criticism of the authoritarian regime come more from the Right, and 
in Southern Europe, more from the Left. However, after a 20–30 year period the 
relationship almost disappears in support for democracy, but remains slightly 
significant, but still really weak, in evaluation of the authoritarian regime. The 
study proves that LRI is an important factor in explaining support for 
democratic regime at the beginning if democratic period. The results for the six 
analysed countries tend to confirm also the tendency that in more ideologically 
polarized countries the association between LRI and support for democracy is 
stronger. 
The empirical studies of this dissertation confirm that concept of LR is 
develops and changes in several ways in new democracies, and the end result is 
LRI being more relevant and understanding of it being more similar across 
different societies. Hence, they confirm that there is a vivid process of socia-
lisation and concept-construction in play, but unfortunately they do not enable a 
deeper explanation of why and how this process occurs – is it the result of 
lifelong learning or replacing cohorts, which is the role of institutions, including 
parties, etc? Therefore, concerning political socialisation and the development 
of the concept, the present results provide a solid starting point by raising many 
questions for future research to address.  
 
 
  Conclusions  
The objective of the dissertation was to examine the country and individual 
level determinants of LRI and the effect of LRI in countries with different 
political trajectories in order to evaluate the relevance and content of LRI. To 
study the relevance and value content of LRI, this dissertation used four 
theories – irrelevance, transformation, persistence or pluralisation – as a tool, 
assessing which of them best applies to LRI. In addition, I extended the research 
in two ways – in broadening the circle of factors by focusing on country level 
variables and in encompassing a larger variety of countries in one study.  
The concept of LRI is relevant because people in most countries are able to 
locate themselves on the LR scale; and even populations in new democracies, 
who are less familiar with the concept, associate this concept with certain 
values. LR should be considered relevant even though one’s ability to place 
oneself on the LR scale, as well as the value content of LR, vary notably across 
populations and countries. The varying value content of LR (which values and 
how they are related to LR) depends on the level of democracy as well as on 
other cultural macro level and individual level factors. The current research 
shows that although there might be some additional value content/meaning attri-
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buted to LRI as a result of passing through different phases in the development 
of a democratic society, there also exists a common core. In a country’s path 
from authoritarian regime to democracy, support for democracy/democratic 
values will be added to the content of LRI; and with economic and social 
progress post-materialist values will be added to the content of LRI. However, 
we can highlight here two main conflicting dimensions determining the content 
of LRI in most countries, most of the time – support for economic equality 
versus accepting economic inequality (as economic Left and Right) and support 
for change versus support for tradition or the old system (as social Left and 
Right). Deviations from the general Western template, especially in post-com-
munist countries, should not make us question the overall value of Left and 
Right as an ideological orientation tool: in new democracies, especially in those 
with a different path from Western societies, it takes some time to adopt this 
common understanding. 
The findings from the five empirical studies of this dissertation certainly 
provide different opportunities for implications, but overall, persistence and 
pluralisation theories are more plausible, and in the long run the first is pre-
ferable. The value content of LRI can be considered persistent even despite the 
temporary diversifying value content of LRI which accompanies in the course 
of development of a new democratic society. We should understand, and it is 
worth emphasising, that LRI as concept is valid primarily in liberal democratic 
systems with free political competition, and, therefore, in undemocratic 
societies and in new democracies LRI does not strictly follow the logic of older 
consolidated democracies, as the circumstances – historical background and 
social structure – are different. People in less democratic societies need some 
time to adjust to the concept in the context of liberal democracy and that is 
especially true for former communist countries, which have taken a different 
political route. For example, if we would like to apply the concept – where Left 
supports changes for greater equality and Right supports maintaining natural 
inequality – in the context where inequality has been removed in communist 
society, for instance, then it seems obvious that LRI is not useful. However, the 
findings of this dissertation give us at least good reason to believe that in terms 
of LRI, its recognition and value content in new democracies, post-communist 
ones included, will be similar to consolidated democracies after a few decades 
of democratic transition. 
In order to evaluate adequately the contribution of dissertation, it is important 
to keep in mind that it suffers from some deficiencies. First, data availability 
sets some limitations on the geographical and temporal scope and on available 
factors; therefore, one or two out of those three has to be sacrificed in order to 
arrive at a better analysis in one aspect. In all cases, the range of countries is 
limited to those that are available in datasets. In some cases (V) more than others, 
the explanatory power of the model is small as the number of factors included in 
the analysis is limited in order to increase the range of countries and survey 
years. Furthermore, in other cases (III, IV), the number of countries is limited in 
order to permit a deeper analysis and hence these studies suffer from their 
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inability to allow generalisations. Moreover, for more definitive conclusions 
about new democracies, especially about post-communist ones, a decade or 
more from now will likely give us more information about the final as the result 
of the political socialisation. And finally, we have to keep in mind that not all 
new democracies will follow the same path and end up as consolidated 
democratic societies; they may be stuck in transition for a long period or revert 
to dictatorship, and even in long-term democracies the quality of democracy can 
vary considerably. 
Although the current and prior research has provided us with some knowledge 
about LRI, its determinants, content and effects, the concept is too broad, varies 
over time and across countries and is affected by far by too many factors – on 
individual, institutional and country level – to be well predicted, at least for the 
present moment. The combining of individual and macro level variables, as well 
as factors from different research fields, has already received some attention and 
application, but there is enough room for further exploration. In order to arrive 
possibly at a complete understanding of how LRI as an abstract concept is 
constructed and is changing, future research should concentrate on more in-
depth analysis, tracing the development of LRI, perhaps first limited to a single 
society. Further studies should include individual demographics, values and 
attitudes, the country’s past, political system and culture, party system, action of 
parties and media, important events, as well as factors from psychology and 
other disciplines.  
In addition, this dissertation clearly attempts to respond to the need for more 
longitudinal studies to assess the speed and scope of ideological change 
emphasised by Geser (2008: 35), for example, but does not touch some areas, 
like comparison of age cohorts. Cohort analysis in studies of LRI has been 
applied by a few authors (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2016, Pop-Eleches and 
Tucker 2010), but they have been limited to determining an effect on a position 
on the LR dimension and have not gone as far as examining generational effects 
on the value content of LRI. 
Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) have studied in depth the effect of com-
munist legacies and compared the effect of cohorts on LR self-positioning in 
post-communist countries. Although they are interested in the effects on posi-
tioning of the LR dimension and not on the value content of LRI, their results 
suggest that experience with communist rule is not as determining to LR 
self-positioning as is individual experience after transition – during the transition 
more successful people tend to locate themselves to the Right. The fact that 
early socialisation might not be so important in the formation of political values 
and attitudes is also detected in studies of the support for democracy (Mishler 
and Rose 2002). There is no reason to expect the exact same effect to be applied 
to the value content of LRI, but the generational effect is worthy of further 
study as this would enable us to evaluate whether a convergence of value 
content of LR with the Western template is a result the replacing of older gene-
rations with newer ones, thus confirming the impressionable years or attitude 
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persistence approach, or whether it is a result of all citizens adapting the new 
concept through lifelong learning.  
As a conclusion, although the terms Left and Right have been heavily criti-
cised – scholars and politicians talk about those terms as no longer being 
useful – they are still the most widely-used concepts. Despite promotion of two 
rival tendencies for why the concept no longer matters – namely because 
everybody has moved into the centre or because everybody has moved to the 
far-Right – LRI research, this study included, shows that Left and Right are 
generally similarly understood and the relevance of LR can even increase when 
new democracies reach maturity. The concepts of Left and Right are not without 
utility; we simply have to remember that their use is somewhat context-specific. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Vasak- ja parempoolse enesemääratluse olulisus, tähendus ning  
mõju erineva režiimitrajektooriga riikides 
Vasak- ja parempoolsus on üleilmselt kasutatav mõistepaar poliitikate, parteide, 
ideoloogiate ja inimeste vaadete kirjeldamiseks. Vasak- ja parempoolsus on 
mõisteline tööriist, mis lihtsustab valijatel otsuste tegemist, aga annab võima-
luse ka nii teadlastel, parteidel kui ka lihtsalt poliitikast huvitatutel poliitika-
maastikul toimuvat mõtestada. Samas seatakse selle nende mõistete kasulikkus 
vaatamata nende populaarsusele tihti kahtluse alla, kaheldakse, kas neil mõis-
tetel on selge ja üldmõistetav sisu või on tegemist tühjade siltidega, mida võib 
ükskõik milliste vaadete külge kleepida.  
Kahtluseks on põhjust andnud mitmed paralleelsed nähtused. Esile on tõus-
nud paremäärmuslikud parteid, kelle kogu ideoloogiat ei anna tingimata allutada 
vasak-parem skaalale, ning ka üldisemalt võidutseb poliitilises retoorikas popu-
lism. Lisaks on kodanike identiteet mitmekesistunud: inimeste staatus sõltub 
enamast kui päritolust või varast ja seetõttu võib vastandumise dimensioone olla 
rohkem kui üks. Viimaks, kommunismi kokku kukkumise järgsed noored demo-
kraatlikud riigid, kus asetleidvad protsessid ei korda tingimata arenenud demo-
kraatiates nähtut, on pannud teadlasi kahtlema paljude protsesside ja nähtuste 
universaalsuses, seejuures vasak-ja parempoolsuse vastanduse kasutatavuses. 
Aluse selleks on andnud leiud, et Ida-Euroopas on levinud arusaamad, kus libe-
raalseid vaateid ja reforme toetavad elanikud on parempoolsed, mitte vasak-
poolsed. See ei sobi kokku klassikalise Lääne-Euroopa lähenemisega, kus sot-
siaalne liberaalsus käib koos majandusliku vasakpoolsuse ehk suurema majan-
dusliku võrdsuse toetamisega. Just Ida-Euroopa elanikele omased kõrvalekalded 
vasak-ja parempoolsuse tõlgendamisel on tõukeks selle doktoritöö kirjutamisele. 
Väitekiri lähtub eeldusest, et vasak- ja parempoolsuse tähendus ja sisu on 
konstrueeritud ning see varieerub riigiti ja ka indiviiditi, ja proovib leida vastuse 
küsimusele, mis on täheldatud erinevuste põhjuseks ning kas vaatamata tähen-
duse varieerumisele võime rääkida siiski nende mõistete ühest universaalsest 
sisust. Doktoritöös vaadeldakse eelkõige noori demokraatiad, mille puhul küsit-
lusandmed võimaldavad analüüsida vasak- ja parempoolsuse kujunemist demo-
kraatliku perioodi algusest peale. Kuna töö on inspireeritud post-kommunistlike 
Ida-Euroopa riikide eripäradest, siis on võrdluseks kaasatud ka neist erineva, 
endise paremautoritaarse režiimiga noored demokraatiad. Kahe grupi ajas võrd-
lemine võimaldab hinnata, kuidas sõltub vasak- ja parempoolsuse tähendus 
varasemast autoritaarsest taustast ning edasisest demokraatlikust kogemusest. 
Töö peamine oletus on järgmine: vahetult pärast demokraatliku valitsemise 
algust alustatakse ühiskonnas poliitilise maastiku kujundamisega, sealhulgas 
vasak- ja parempoolsuse mõiste konstrueerimisega, kus selle mõiste sisu sõltub 
konkreetse ühiskonna taustast ja seal esinevatest olulisematest probleemidest. 
Seejuures omistavad endistes parem-autoritaarse režiimiga demokraatiates 
inimesed vasakpoolsusele selliseid väärtusi nagu uuenduslikkus, liberaalsus, 
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vabadus ning avatus; endistes vasak-autoritaarse režiimiga demokraatiates seos-
tatakse samu väärtusi aga kommunismile vastandudes parempoolsusega. Demok-
raatliku kogemuse kasvades ja poliitilise sotsialiseerumise tulemusena esialgsed 
erinevused aga kaovad.  
Väitekiri koosneb neljast avaldatud teadusartiklist ja ühest veel avaldamata 
käsikirjast, mis põhinevad kõik indiviiditasandi andmete statistilisel analüüsil, 
kuhu on kaasatud lisaks indiviiditasandi teguritele ka riigitasandi tegureid. 
Kasutatud küsitlusandmed on pärit eelkõige kahest allikast: Võrdlev riiklike 
valimiste projekt (Comparative National Elections Project) ja Maailma väärtus-
uuring/Euroopa väärtusuuring (World Values Survey/European Value Study), 
kuid kahes artiklis on kasutatud ajalise dimensiooni laiendamiseks andmeid 
projektist “Lõuna-Euroopa Poliitiline kultuur: Nelja riigi uurimus” (“The politi-
cal culture of Southern Europe – A Four Nation Study”, 1985). 
Neist kaks artiklit hõlmavad väga erineva arengutaseme ja kultuurilise 
taustaga riike üle maailma USAst Mosambiigini ning uurivad Võrdleva riiklike 
valimiste projekti andmetele toetudes elanike võimet ennast ja parteisid vasak-
parem skaalal määratleda ning seda, millised väärtused seotakse vasak-parem 
vastandusega. Selgub, et Vasaku ja Parema eristamine kõnetab inimesi üle maa-
ilma. Kuigi võime ennast vasak-parem skaalale paigutada suureneb ühiskonna 
demokraatliku ja sotsiaalse arengu ning poliitilise võistluslikkuse tulemusena, 
suudavad ka juba vähearenenud riikide elanikud ennast sellele skaalale paigu-
tada. Teiseks leiab kinnitust, et vasak- ja parempoolsusega seotavad väärtused ja 
hoiakud erinevad riigiti olulisel määral. Nii näiteks omistatakse Läänest väljas-
pool vähemarenenud ühiskondades vasak- ja parempoolsuse mõistetele hoia-
kuid, nagu konflikti aktsepteerimine, mitmekultuurilisuse pooldamine või riigi 
eestkoste toetamine. 
Kaks järgmist artiklit keskenduvad kahest erinevast autoritaarse taustaga 
regioonist, Ida-Euroopast ja Lõuna-Euroopast pärit riikide võrdlemisele. Uuri-
muses kasutatakse peamiselt Maailma väärtusuuringu/Euroopa väärtusuuringu 
andmeid, kuid paremaks ajaliseks võrdluseks ka Lõuna-Euroopa poliitilise 
kultuuri uurimuse andmeid. Ühes neist vaadeldakse seda, kuidas mõjutab vasak- 
ja parempoolse enesemääratluse väärtussisu riikide varasem autoritaarne taust ja 
demokraatliku poliitilise võitluse polariseeritus. Tulemused kinnitavad, et endistes 
vasakautoritaarsetes riikides kalduvad inimesed pigem paremale ning endistes 
paremautoritaarsetes riikides pigem vasakule ning see, kui tugevalt vasak- ja 
parempoolsust väärtustega seotakse, sõltub parteide polariseerumisest. Teises 
vaadeldakse, kuidas mõjutavad vasak- ja parempoolsed vaated suhtumist 
demokraatiasse ning endisesse autoritaarsesse riigikorda. Kõigis kuues riigis on 
vahetult pärast demokraatliku korra loomist vasak- ja parempoolsed vaated 
demokraatliku (ja endise autoritaarse) korra toetamisega seotud. Seejuures pool-
davad Balti riikides ehk endistes vasak-autoritaarse režiimiga riikides parem-
poolsed demokraatiat ning on autoritaarse korra vastu, ning Lõuna-Euroopa 
parem-autoritaarse taustaga riikides esineb täpselt vastupidine suundumus. Pärast 
paarikümneaastast demokraatlikku perioodi puudub uuritud riikides vasak- ja 
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parempoolsetel vaadetel demokraatliku korra toetamisega igasugune seos, kuid 
väga nõrk seos autoritaarse korra toetamisega jääb. 
Viimane, käsikirjaline uurimus toetub Maailma väärtusuuringu/Euroopa 
väärtusuuringu andmetele ning uurib, milliseid väärtusi seovad vasak- ja parem-
poolsusega inimesed erineva autoritaarse taustaga noortes demokraatiates ning 
kas demokraatliku kogemuse kasvades vasak- ja parempoolsuse väärtussisu 
muutub või mitte. See kinnitab, et leiab aset suundumus, et noortes demok-
raatiates vasak- ja parempoolne enesemääratlus areneb ja muutub. Pärast demok-
raatliku režiimi kehtestamist tähistavad mõisted Vasak ja Parem esialgu küllalt 
mitmekesist väärtuste ringi. Autoritaarsest režiimist demokraatiasse üleminekul 
omistatakse vasak- ja parempoolsele vastandusele konflikt demokraatia poolda-
mise ja selle vastasuse vahel, kuid selle olulisus kaob pärast mõnekümneaastast 
demokraatlikku kogemust. Majandusliku ja sotsiaalse arenguga lisanduvad 
vasak- ja parempoolsele enesemääratlusele ka materiaalsete ja postmateriaalsete 
väärtuste telg. Endistes vasak-autoritaarsetes riikides esialgu ilmnev vastandlik 
seos sotsiaalse liberaalsuse ja parempoolsuse vahel aga kaob. 
Väitekirja peamine järeldus on, et kuigi vasak- ja parempoolsuse tähendus 
võib varieeruda ja selle vastanduse võivad täita erinevad väärtused, on kõrvale-
kalded selle universaalsest tähendusest omased pigem noortele demokraatiatele, 
mistõttu võib väita, et vastuolulised arusaamad vasak- ja parempoolsusest on 
pigem ajutised ning üldiselt liigub vasak- ja parempoolsuse mõistete kasutamine 
suurema ühtsuse poole. Vasak- ja parempoolsuse universaalse olemuse võib 
kokku võtta Seymour Martin Lipseti jt (1954) sõnadega: “Vasaku all peame 
silmas suuremale võrdsusele – poliitilisele, majanduslikule, sotsiaalsele – suu-
natud ühiskondlike muutuste eest seismist; Parema all peame silmas tradit-
sioonilise, enam või vähem hierarhilise ühiskonnakorra toetamist ja suuremale 
võrdsusele suunatud muutustele vastu seismist.” (p. 1135). 
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